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JANUARY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-TWO
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the* Constitution, or a
telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very
tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
The University of Missouri School of Law regrets to announce the
death of Judge John D. Lawson. Judge Lawson died Friday, October
twenty-eighth, in Chicago and was buried in Columbia, Mo. Judge Lawson came to the University of Missouri in 1891 as professor of Contracts
and International Law. In 1903 he was made Dean of the School of
Law and continued in this capacity until 1912. At that time he was
compelled to resign on account of his failing health. He was greatly
beloved by all the students who came to this school while he was connected with it. He had great capacity for inspiring the students and has
made marked contributions to legal literature. It is not too much to
say that his name is familiar to every lawyer in the United States.

NOTES ON RECENT
MISSOURI CASES
MORTGAGES-VALIDITY OF DEED OF TRUST GIVEN TO
SECURE THE DEBT OF A THIRD PARTY. Finnerty v. Blake
Realty Co.1 Plaintiff brought an action to restrain foreclosure, under a
power of sale,'of a deed of trust, which was given by plaintiff and her
husband, Thomas Finnerty, to secure payment of their recited joint note
1.

(1918)

2 6

Mo.

332,

207

S.

W.

772.

(31)
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for $6,000 dated April 1st, 1908, and payable to one Willemsen three
years from date. As a matter of fact no such note was ever executed
by plaintiff. She never intended to execute such a note, or that the deed
of trust should secure any obligation whatever to Willemsen, or to anyone else. So far as plaintiff was concerned, apparently she only gave
the deed of trust to help her husband in his business if such aid could
be given without the deed's serving as security for any real debt. Thomas Finnerty, however, at the time that the deed was executed, did, without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, give his own individual promissory
note to Willemsen for $6,000 together with the deed of trust, intending
that it should secure any obligation that might arise from the note,
and Willemsen, without giving value to Thomas Finnerty, endorsed the
note in blank, without recourse, and delivered it with the deed of trust
back again to Thomas Finnerty.
Thoma3 Finnerty then recorded the deed of trust and kept it and the
note; which it was intended to secure, in his possession until its maturity
at which time the note was extended by Willemsen for a period of five
years and left with the deed of trust in Finnerty's keeping. Thereafter,
Thomas Finnerty purchased some property from one Creb9, giving Crebs.
purchase money notes in payment of the same, and depositing with Crebs
as collateral security for the payment of these notes, the Willemsen note
and deed of trust. Still later Crebs sold the purchase money notes, and
assigned along with them the Willemson note and deed of trust to Blake
Realty Co. After the Blake Co. had purchased these notes, Thomas
Finnerty defaulted inmthe payment of the same, and the Blake Co. duly
foreclosed the pledge, purchasing itself the Willemsen note and deed of
trust. The Blake Co., having thus become the owner of the deed of
trust and the note secured thereby, caused a foreclosure sale to be commenced at the proper time, and at this point plaintiff brought this action,
claiming that the deed was not valid as to her interest in the property
because she had not made the conveyance to secure any debt whatsoever. The Circuit Court issued an injunction restraining foreclosure of
the deed as to plaintiff's interest and upon appeal the Supreme Court
affirmed the decree.
The Supreme Court held that the deed of trust so far as plaintiff
was affected thereby was a nullity. In this connection the court said:
"A conveyance of real property by a mortgage or deed of trust in the
nature of a mortgage can only be effective as such when given to secure
a pre-existing, then created or after-arising obligation, or the performance of some duty entailing a pecuniary liability. Absent therefore,.
the existence of a debt, and the necessary consequent relation of debtor
and creditor between the grantor and the grantee there caa be no mort-
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gage or deed of trust. (Sheppard v. Wagner 240 Mo. 1. c. 433.)"2 The
court then found that plaintiff had incurred no indebtedness in any of
the above enumerated transactions, and accordingly held that the deed
as to plaintiff was not a valid security. The court also suggested that
even conceding that Thomas Finnerty might be indebted under the Willemsen note, and the deed effective to cover his interest in the land conveyed, still this fact would not affect plaintiff's rights because the
deed, to pass her interest as security would have to secure her debt.
Said the court: "Therefore whatever binding force the conveyance had
in securing the paymenj of the debt evidenced by the note, was limited
to his (i. e. Thomas Finnerty's) interest in the real estate described and
not to that of the respondent (i. e. plaintiff's). This because it was not
her debt * * *" 3
Whenever a mortgage is given and it secures no obligation whatever,
it cannot be foreclosed and the plea that there was no debt secured will
defeat an action of foreclosure. Indeed the mortgagor can show, under
such a plea by parol evidence that the debt recited as secured never did
exist, and that no debt at all was intended to be secured or was secured.
Equity has always regarded a mortgage as being merely incidental to the
debt, and it is always provable that no debt existed. 4 Now in, the instant case apparently there never was any debt which was to be secured by
plaintiff's deed and therefore the result of the decision was probably
correct.4 a
It is not, however, the purpose of this note to discuss
this problem, but rather to inquire into the soundness of the general rule stated by the court to the effect that there never can be
a valid mortgage or deed of trust unless the same is given to secure
the debt or obligation of the the mortgagor or grantor. Must there,
as the court argues in the principal case, be a debtor-creditor relation between the grantor and the grantee? Suppose that A desires
to aid B in borrowing money from C, and in order to accomplish
this result he gives to C a mortgage or deed of trust to secure money
loaned by C to B at his, A's, request. Is it possible that upon foreclosure,
in the event of B's default, that A can defeat the action by showing that
he, A, is not the principal debtor and that he did not incur any debt
himself? If such is the rule, it should be distinctly understood by the
business community, as it would seem to go contrary to the normal con2.

(1918)

W. 772.
3. (1918)
W. 772.

276 Mo. 1. c. 338,

207 S.

276 Mo. 1. c. 338, 207 S.

4. Harwood v. Toms (1895)

130 Mo.

225, 32 S. W. 666; Lappin v. Crawford

(1909)

221

Mo.

380,

120

S. W.

605;

Schaeppi v. Glade (1902)
195 Il1. 62,
62 N. E. 874; Fisher v. Meister (1872)
24 Mich. 447. See also Crews v. Lore.

bard (1916)
4a.

(Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 825.

See infra note 11.
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ception as to the nature and functions of a mortgage. Moreover, it
should be pointed out that such a rule will lead directly to the proposition that every time a married man procures his wife to join in a
mortgage to secure merely his debt, or obligation, the wife's dower rights
will not be affected by the mortgage, or pass as security, "this because it
was not her debt" 5 that was secured.
"A mortgage is a security for the performance of an agreement,
which is usually to pay a sum of money. Leaving out of view other
agreements than those for the payment of money, it is essential that
there be an agreement, either express or implied, on the part of the mortgagor, or some one in whose behalf he executes the mortgage, to pay to
the mortgagee a sum of money. If there is no debt there is no mortgage."6
The requirement of a debt is fundamental, because, if there is nothing
to secure, the mortgage can have no purpose for existing, but it is one
thing to say that there must be a debt, and another to say that the debt
must be that of the mortgagor. Why cannot a mortgagee buy security
from the mortgagor to secure the debt of another, and why cannot the
extension of credit to that other be the consideration furnished for
the security given by the mortgage? 7 It is believed that as a matter of
principle and justice that this ought to be possible and there is authority so holding.
In Herron v. Stevenson 8 a mortgagor gave a mortgage to secure a
note upon which her three sons were liable as endorsers, but with which
note she had no connection whatever. The court held that the mortgage was valid and this although the mortgagor secured no pecuniary
advantage as a result of the transaction. The case of giving a mortgage
to secure the debt of another has arisen most frequently where a wife
has conveyed her property to secure the obligation of her husband. Such
a mortgage is generally held to be valid and the cases in Missouri are
in accord. In Johnson v. Franklin Bank 9 it was held that a wife could
validly give a deed of trust on her separate property to secure the pay5. 276 Mo. 1. c. 338.
The quotation
is from the opinion in the principal case.
6. Henley v. Hotaling (1871) 41 Cal.
22, p. 28.
7. As a matter of simple equity the
mortgagee ought to succeed.
A man
who has advanced money on the faith
of security mty well lose "his all" if
his security if; denied him.
For this
very reason equity has always specifically
enforced contracts to give a mortgage
if the plaintiff's side of the agreement
has been executed.
Hermann v. Hodges

(1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 18; Irvine v. Armstrong (1883)
31 Minn. 216; Dean v.
Anderson (1881)
34 N. J. Eq. 496.
The mortgagee's "equity"
is
just as
great in a case where the credit to be
secured is extended to a third party as
where it is extended to the mortgagor
and the same principles should govern.
8. (1918) 259 Pa. St. 354, 102 Atl.
1049.
9. (1903)
173 Mo. 171; 73 S. W.
191.
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ment of her husband's note, although she received no benefit from the
transaction. x0 It is urged that the rule embodied in the decisions, last
cited, are in direct conflict with that stated in the case under review, but
because there were other grounds on which the decision in the principal case might have been rested, it is not believed that the former cases
are necessarily overruled. The matter, however, at this time is in doubt,
and it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court may have an early opportunity to explain the exact holding in the Finnerty case, and settle the
question as to the functions of.a mortgage."
It is to be noted that the court in the instant case cited Sheppard
v. Wagner12 to support the proposition that the validity of a mortgage
or deed of trust depends on the relation of debtor and creditor between the parties to the instrument. In that case the question for determination was whether or not the transaction between the parties was
a mortgage or a conditional sale. The court, quoting from Bobb v. Wolff's
said: "While the courts have applied many tests to disclose the trfie
nature of the transaction, whether an absolute deed or a mortgage, the
one sure test, and essential requisite has ever been 'the continued existence of a debt' from the grantor to the grantee in the deed. If there
is no debt, the instrument cannot be a mortgage whatever else it may be,
but if the investigation develops an existing indebtedness by the grantor
to the grantee * * * the courts have with great unanimity construed
the deed to be only a mortgage." 14
In the connection in which the quoted statement was made it was
sound and proper. If a real mortgage is disguised as a conditional sale,
10. See accord Jones v. Edeman
(1909) 223 Mo. 312, 122 S. W. 1047.
In Schneider v. Staihr (1855) 20 Mo.
269, a wife mortgaged her separate property to secure her husband's obligation.
It was held that but for the wife's minority, she electing to avoid the mortgage,
that it would have been valid and enforceable.
See
accord Hagerman v.
Sutton (1887) 91 Mo. 519, 4 S. W. 73;
Rines v. Mansfield (1888) 96 Mo. 394,
9 S. W. 798; Barrett v. Davis (1891)
104 Mo. 549, 16 S. W. 377; Ferguson v.
Soden (1892) 111 Mo. 208, 19 S. W.
727; Hach v. Hill (1891) 106 Mo. 18,
16 S. W. 948; McCollum v. Boughton
(1895) 132 Mo. 601, 30 S. W. 1028.
See also Wilcox v. Todd (1877) 64 Mo.
388; Thornton v. Bank (1879) 71 Mo.
221; Melcher v. Derkum (1891) 44 Mo.
App. 650; Bell v. Bell (1908) 133 Mo.

App. 570, 113 S. W. 667.
11. In Graham v. Finnerty (1921) 232
S. W. 129, the same transaction as in
the principal case was again before the
Supreme Court. The court stated (232
S. W. 1. c. 130) that its former decision,
i. e., the one under review,- held the
deed of trust void as to plaintiff because
It was given as security without her
authority. The court did not refer at
all to the proposition here under discussico to the effect that a deed of
trust must secure the grantor's debt. A
discussion of this point was unnecessary
to its decision.
There has therefore
been no direct repudiation of this proposition,
12. (1911) 240 Mo. 409, 144 S. W.
394.
13. (1898) 148 Mo. 335, 49 S. W. 996.
14. 240 Mo. 1. c. 433.
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the apparent seller or grantor has a right to prove this fact, have the
instrument reformed and to redeem. 15 Naturally, the way to prove that
the transaction was in reality a mortgage was to show that there was a
debt between the parties and that the conveyance was given to secure
that debt, and if there was no debt proven to exist the grant could not
have been considered a mortgage. Moreover, as the only debt which the
plaintiff claimed to exist was one alleged to be due from the grantor
to the grantee, it was natural and proper for the court to say that in
that case there would have to be found to be a debt due from the former to the latter. In Bobb v. Wolff"6 the question before the court was
similar to that in the Sheppard case, namely, whether a deed absolute
on its face was to be construed as a mortgage, and the court again held
that it could not be so construed unless it was shown that there was. a
debt intended to be secured from the grantor to the grantee. This also
was a correct decision, and as again the only debt, which it was asserted existed was one stated to be due, from the grantor to the grantee the
court said that the obligation had to run from that person. But suppose
that in either of these cases the absolute grant had been made by the
grantor, not to secure his own debt, but that of another person. It is
believed that the decision under these conditions could and should have
been the same, because there was a debt, and an intention to give the land
17
as security.
In other words, the emphasis in the above discussed cases is not to
be laid especially on the fact that the grantor owed money and secured
the same, but on the fact that there was some debt (which happened in
both of the cases mentioned to be that of the grantor) to secure which the
conveyance was made by the grantor. It is believed that the Sheppard
and Bobb cases do not stand for the proposition that in all cases a mortgage or deed of trust to be valid must secure the debt of the mortgagor,
or grantor, but merely hold that without a debt there cannot be a mortgage. Accordingly, it would seem that neither case sustains the rule for
which it was cited in the Finnerty case.
P. M. M.
PRACTICE-DIRECTION OF VERDICT FOR THE PARTY
HAVING (a) THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND (b) THE DUTY OF
GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE. Downs v. Horton.'
Attention should be called to an error in a note on this subject in the
15. Sheppard v. Wagner, supra, note
12. Bobb v. Wolff, infra, note 16. See
generally L. R. A. 1916 B. 18, note.
16. 148 Mo. 335, 49 S. W. 996.

17. See Villa v. Rodriguez (1870)
12 Wall. (U. S.) 323, accord with suggestion.
1. (1921) 230 S. W. 103.
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last issue of the Law Series.

It was there incorrectly stated that Quis-

enberry v. Stewart2 is the last case in Missouri holding that the court
will not direct a verdict for the party having the burden of proof where
there is no contradictory evidence.
Just before the note was written, the decision in St. Louis Trust
Company v. Hill8 was handed down in accord with the Quisenberry case.
Since that time two decisions, Lafferty v. Kansas City Casualty Company4 and Foster v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, have been
given which are in full accord with the rule announced in the Quisenberry
case.
There have been other recent decisions, said to be in accord with the
above general rule, which should be considered. They are especially interesting in the study of the question of directing the verdict for the
proponent of an issue. These are bills and notes cases where plaintiff
claims to be a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity and defendant pleads fraud in the inception and knowledge by plaintiff as the
defense. It has recently been held by the Supreme Court that where
the holder of the instrument shows by uncontradicted testimony that he
is the holder in good faith for value before maturity, and the maker
offers no evidence of knowledge upon the part of plaintiff, the alleged
bona fide purchaser for value before maturity, of the fraud the plaintiff
-the holder-is entitled to a directed verdict.6
The decision in these cases turned upon the meaning of Section 854
R. S. Mo. 1919, which states, "- but where it is shown that the
title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the
burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom
he claims acquired the title in due course, - - -". It might seem from
that statute that the burden of proving no knowledge of the fraud is
upon the plaintiff. It was so held in the early decisions 7 under the
statute and thc courts refused to direct a verdict for the holder. Hill
v. Dillion,8 decided by the Springfield Court of Appeals, in 1913, was
authority for holding that the burden was on the holder, and that the
court could not direct a verdict for him. The court there stated that
though it would have been proper to direct the verdict in such a case
prior to the passing of this section in 1905, it would not now be proper
2. (1920)
Series p. 46.
3. (1920)
4. (1921)
5. (1921)
6. Downs

595.

219

S.

W.

625, 22

Law

223 S. W. 434.
229 S. W. 750.
233 S. W. 499.
v. Horton (1919) 209 S. W.

7. Link v. Jackson (1911) 158 Mo.
A. 63, 139 S. W. 588; Johnson County
Savings Bank v. Mills (1910) 143 Mo.
A. 265, 127 S. W. 425.
8. (1913) 176 Mo. App. 192, 161 S.
W. 881.
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to direct for the holder, he being made the proponent by the statute.
But other decisionssa were made which held that the term burden
in the statute did not mean burden of proof, but burden of evidence, or
as it is more commonly called, the burden of going forward, and that
under the statute the defendant, the maker of the instrument, held the
burden of proving that plaintiff knew of the fraud. Under this reasoning, it was held, the verdict could be directed for the holder of the note
without violating the general rule, that a verdict cannot be directed in
favor of the party having the burden of proof.
9
In the recent case of Downs v. Horton, the Springfield Court reversed its ruling in the Hill v. Dillion, supra, and held that the statute in
question only placed the burden of going forward on the holder after
proof of fraud in the inception and it was not only proper, but that it
was the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict for the holder, if the
plaintiff-holder showed by uncontradicted testimony that he was a holder
in due course for value before maturity and the maker offered no evidence of knowledge of the fraud. This decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in a very able and lucid opinion written by Ragland, C.
The learned writer of the opinion called attention to other Missouri decisions, not bills and notes cases, which had held that a verdict should
be directed by a trial court against the party having the duty of going
10
The decision was
forward with the evidence, who fails to go forward.
later followed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Ensign v. Crandall,"
and is now without doubt, the law in the state on this point.
It is submitted that this is a sound decision as a matter of principle
and highly desirable. The refusal to direct in such cases frequently resulted in destroying the rule as to bona fide purchasers of commercial
paper. In cases where the maker has been defrauded, and failed to receive value for his note, juries were strongly inclined against returning
verdicts in favor of holders in due course. Verdicts for defendants frequently rendered by juries, in cases of this type, would without doubt in
time seriously affect the prime object of the law of negotiable paper, viz,
that negotiable paper shall have as nearly as possible the attributes of
currency.
A review of the cases will demonstrate that whether a verdict could
be directed for the holder in a bills and notes case before and after the
section in question (which is a part of the N. I. L.) was passed in 1905
8a. Reeves

v. Letts (1910)

143 Mo.

App. 196, 128 ,3. W. 246; Bank v. Rail.
road (1913) 172 Mo. App. 662, 155 S. W.
1111.
9. (1919) 209 S. W. 595.

10.

Morgan v. Durfee (1879)

69 Mo.

469, 33 Am. Rep. 508; Rubcottom v.
Telegraph Co. (1916) 194 Mo. App. 234,
186 S. W. 749.
11. (1921) 231 S. W. 675.
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was in a state of confusion and uncertainty.'Ia- Why then, we are inclined to ask, should the courts be bound, hard and fast, by a rule forbidding the direction in favoriof the proponent? It is submitted that
these cases involve the same principles as the cases where a party has the
burden of proof and there is no contrary evidence. The court is deciding that certain evidence is true, and is not permitting a jury to pass
upon the credibility of witnesses who are not impeached and whose testimony is not improbable, when it decides that the burden of going forward has not been met and directs a verdict. The sole reason assigned why it has not the power to direct a verdict for the party with the
burden of proof is that to do so is to deprive the jury of its power to
decide whether the oral evidence of the witnesses is worthy of belief.
In neither case, it is thought, is there an invasion of the province of'the
jury because in each instance there is no issue of fact for the jury to
decide. The reasons for this position, viz, that there is no issue of fact
tq be decided and therefore nothing to go to the jury, will not again be
set forth here as they have been fully set forth in the previous note men12
tioned at the outset of this note.
P. M. P.
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS
NOT EVIDENCE. Stack v.
General Baking Co.' In the above case James Carroll testified that he
had never been convicted of petit larceny. He was shown a record of
conviction of James Carroll for petit larceny. The witness explained
that the James Carroll mentioned in the record was his uncle. The
court excluded the record. The appellant argued that there was a presumption of identity of persons from identity of names. The Supreme
Court of Missouri did not question the presumption but held that it disappeared as soon as the witness testified as above set forth, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The soundness of this decision, it is believed, cannot be questioned
successfully. However, there appears to have been considerable confusion in other opinions of the Missouri courts in dealing with presumptions. In Gilt v. Watson,2 a contest over the legal title to certain land,
the rule was thus stated: "Both plaintiff and defendant claimed under
Shaver. If there was a want of identity between the Shaver named by
11a. Johnson v. Grayson (1910) 230
Mo. 380, 130 S. W. 673; Hamilton v.
Marks (1876) 63 Mo. 167; Johnson v.
McMurry (1880) 72 Mo. 278; Wright
Inv. Co. v. Friscoe Realty Co. (1903)
173 Mo. 72, 77 S. W. 296; Bank v. Ham.

mond
677.
12.
1.
2.

(1907) 124 Mo. A. 177, 101 S. W.
22 Law Series, p. 46.
(1920) 223 S. W. 89.
(1853) 18 Mo. 274.
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the defendant in deducing his title, with the Shaver who owned the certificate of location, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff. The names
being identical, prima facie they are the same person, and it rests with
the plaintiff to show that they are not the same."
The opinion in Flournoy v. Warden3 except for one statement that
may be construed as. stating that a presumption is a rule of evidence
seems sound in maintaining that a presumption results from identity of
names.
In State v. Moore4 it was stated that "identity of name is prima facie
evidence of identity of person" and in reality it could have been decided that there was a presumption which prevailed since there was no
evidence to the contrary. In State v. McGuire5 the presumption was
properly handled. In Geer v. Lumber and Mining Company6 it was
stated: "We think, therefore, the practicable rule should be that when
the names of the grantor and grantee are the same and the land conveyed is identical, the proof of identity is prima facie sufficient." There
seems to be no objection to such a statement.
Bland, J., in Produce Exchange Bank v. North Kansas City Development Company, by way of dictum, suggests that there is a "presumption
of law that identity of name is evidence of identity of person."7 This
declaration may be questioned. The matter may be stated in this fashion.
John Jones may be shown to be grantee in deed "A" and grantor in
deed "B". Such a showing may be said to constitute evidence of identity
of person. 7a Whether any presumption will arise upon such a showing
is an entirely different matter. 8 If it does arise, the presumption is not
itself evidence. 9
How is a jury to weigh a rule of law, a presumption, with items
of evidence? The significant effect of a presumption is to throw on the
party against whom it operates the burden of going forward with the
evidence.1° In fact, presumptions are a part of the substantive law and
3.
4.

(1853)
(1875)

17 Mo. 435.
61 Mo. 1. c. 279.
5.
(1885) 87 Mo. 642.
In Long v.
McDow (1885) 87 Mo. 197 there is dictum that identity of name is prima
facie evidence of identity of person. See
Jones v. Lumber Co. (1920) 223 S. W.
63, 1. c. 69.
6. (1895) 134 Mo. 85, 34 S. W. 1099.
Keyes v. Munroe (1915) 266 Mo. 114,
180 S. W. 863 affords no basis for the
position that the presumption of identity
of person from identity of names is an
item of evidence.
See Hunt v. Searcy

(1901) 167 Mo. 158, 67 S. W. 2'16.
7. (1919) 212 S. W. (Mo. App.) 899.
7a. See -instruction three for pltintiff
in LaRiviere v. LaRiviere (1883) 77
Mo. 512, 514. Compare Stack v. General
Baking Co., note 1, supra.
8. 4 Wigmore on Evidence, see. 2529.
Huston et al v. Graves (1919) 213 S. W.
77.
9. Hinton's Cases on Evidence, pp.
79-80.
.
10. Thayei's Preliminary Treatis on
Evidence, pp. 563, 575; 4 Wigmorc on
Evidence, sec. 2491.
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do not properly belong to the law of evidence."
In considering the
particular presumption in the above cases, it is a matter of common
reasoning among men that if one meets one James Carroll he is probably the same James Carroll of whom he has heard. Such facts so
often repeat themselves that the process of reasoning is cut short and
a rule of substantive law is laid down, to the effect that where there is
an identity of name it will be presumed there is an identity of person.
Any evidence to the contrary, however, will render the presumption unsafe to rely upon. The result is that it vanishes immediately upon the
introduction of contrary evidence. The presumption itself is not and
cannot be evidence and it has no probative force. If the party against
whom the presumption operates fails to bring forward evidence the
case will be settled by virtue of the presumption. It is not settled that
way because the presumption is evidence, but since there is no evidence
at all, the case is to be so decided according to a rule of substantive law
resulting from the identity of names. Nevertheless, there are too many
courts which assert that a presumption is evidence or has probative value.1 2
It is not believed that this point of view is either theoretically sound or
a satisfactory rule from practical considerations.
The opinions in Missouri with reference to the presumption arising
from identity of names have been fairly uniform. There is no attempt
here to consider many other presumptions. A few decisions, however,
which throw light on the major subject are worthy of attention.
In State v. Shelley13 Sherwood, P. J.,uttered a dictum that the presumption of innocence "in every case is to be regarded by the jury as
matter of evidence to the benefit of which the party is entitled." This is
stated to be erroneous in State ex rel v. Ellison"- where Blair, J.,wrote
a commendable opinion.1 5 It is not only stated that: "The presumption
itself is not evidence," but it is held that it is erroneous in a civil case
upon an insurance policy, the defense being arson, to give an instruction that there is a presumption of innocence of a person alleged to be
guilty of a crime "just as in the trial of a person charged with crime."
11.

Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on
p. 326-327.
See for example Graves v. Col-

Evidence,

12.

well (1878)

90 Ill.612; Clifford v. Tay.

that the presumption of sanity would
have no probative force.
See Thayer,
Preliminary Treatise, p. 564, n. 1.); Haw.
kins v. Grimes (1852)

52 Ky. 257; 8 Col.

lor (1910) 204 Mass. 358, 90 N. E. 862;
Barber's Appeal (1893) 63 Conn. 393, 27

L. R. 127 (Confused discussion. Coinpare 9 Col. L. R. 435; 15 Col. L. R.

Atl. 973, 22 L. R. A. 90 (the reasoning

457.)

as to the nature of a presumption
seems clouded. Compare Wheeler et at
v. Rockett et at (1917) 91 Conn. 388, 100
Atl. 13, a well reasoned opinion stating

13.
430.
14.
23.

(1901)

166 Mo. 616,

(1916)

268 Mo. 239, 187 S. W.

66 S. W.
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This is the correct position though it is admitted by Blair, J., that the
contrary practice has been followed very often in Missouri without disapproval.
In State v. Kennedy' 6 it was held not to be error to refuse an instruction upon the presumption of innocence. The court, however, did
not base its holding upon the proposition that a jury has nothing to do,
with a presumption. Rather the court concluded that an instruction on
reasonable doubt was the legal equivalent of an instruction on presumption of innocence and that the evidence of guilt in the case was too clear
to warrant a reversal of the judgment even if the instruction should,
have been given. It was also suggested that it is better practice to give
such an instruction. Sherwood, J., concurred in the opinion reluctantly
and because the evidence satisfactorily demonstrated the defendant's
guilt.' 7 This probably explains his remark in State v. Shelley, supra.
The contrary point of view was ruled by Lamm, J., in Cornelius vCornelius.18 It was there held that it was error to refuse to instruct
the jury that "the law presumes" that counsel given by a father to his son
is in good faith. It was stated that the argument upholding the trial
court "pressed home would overturn the necessity of giving the rule of law
in criminal cases of a presumption of innocence." Apparently the ruling
in State v. Kennedy, supra, was not in the mind of the writer. In any
event it would seem as if there is very little left of this particular part of
Cornelius v. Cornelius after State ex rel v. Ellison, supra.
In Reynolds v. Casualty Co.'5 Brown, C., for the majority, discussed
the existence of a presumption in case of a death either accidental or
suicidal. It is not clear that he thought that a presumption should be considered an item of evidence. The gist of his opinion on this point seems
to be that in determining the nature of the death "the unreasonableness
of the theory of suicide must receive due consideration in weighing it
against the more reasonable and natural theory of accident." There seems
to be no particular objection to that proposition which certainly is not
a declaration that a rule of law known as a presumption has of itself
evidentiary value.
Faris, J., dissented in a brilliant opinion, in which Bond and Wood15. It would have been better, however, if the opinion had not attempted to
follow a lot of useless terminology concerning presumptions. See 4 Wigmore
on Evid., secs. 2490-2493 inclusive. '
16. (1899) 154 Mo. 268, 55 S. W.
293.
17. The Supreme Court of Missouri
refused to follow the unfortunate opin-

ion of Mr. Justice White in United
States v. Coffin (1895) 156 U. S. 432,
15 U. S. Sup. Rep. 394. See Thayer's
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, p.
551. Compare 9 Harv. L. R. 144.
18. (1910) 233 Mo. 1. c. 36, 135 S
W. 65.
19. (1917) 274 Mo. 83, 201 S. W.
1128.
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son, JJ., concurred. In this opinion we believe that the true nature of
a presumption is stated by Faris, J., as follows: "The moment explanatory evidence comes into the case the presumption dissolves into thin air
and becomes as wholly non-existent as though it never had had exis20
tence."
It seems to follow therefore that a presumption is not itself evidence and it should follow that a jury or trier of fact should not be
instructed in terms of presumptions, 2 ' for example, that certain presumptions exist which should be considered and weighed with the
evidence in deciding questions of fact.
P. M. M.
EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS UPON THE USE OF LANDEMINENT DOMAIN-RIGHT OF COVENANTEE TO COMPENSATION. Peters v. Buckner, et at.' Applications were made for writs
of prohibition and mandamus. By the first writ it was sought to prevent the taking of property, through condemnation proceedings, for school
purposes without allowing to plaintiffs the value of a restrictive covenant, which would be violated by the use to which the land taken was to
be put. The object of the second writ was to compel the assessment
of these damages in the condemnation proceedings. Meadow Park Land
Company for purposes of sale had laid out into lots a new district in
Kansas City. A plat of the addition had been recorded. On this certain
building lines had been marked and other restrictions had been noted.
These restrictions forbade the erection of buildings for other than residential purposes- and fixed a minimum value of the houses thus to be
built. Sonie of the lots within the addition had been conveyed by the
20. One may wholly agree with Far.
is, J., in his incisive analysis of pre-"
sumptions and yet not agree with his
conclusion as to the facts.
It is also
possible that one may disagree with both
opinions as to the conclusions reached as
to the nature of the death.
The plain.
tiff had the burden of convincing that
death was accidental; defendant had the
burden of convincing that death was
suicidal.
One may not be convinced as
to either proposition but find himself unable to come to any satisfactory conclusion.
In that event
the
defendant
should have had judgment.
See for
a similar situation Winans et al. v. Attorney General, House of Lords (1904)

App. Cas. 287, opinion by Earl of Halsbury, L. C.
21. McKenna v. Lynch (1921) 233 S.
W. 175 held the following instructions
erronequs: "You are further instructed
that the burden of proving contributory
negligence on the part of the deceased,
Michael McKenna, is upon the defendant, the presumption is that the deceased was in the exercise of ordinary
care for his own safety at the time of
his death, and this presumption continues until overthrown by a prepon.
derance of greater weight of the evidence."
Compare instruction number
four for plaintiff in La Riviere v. La,
Riviere (1883) 77 Mo. 512.
1. (1921) 232 S. W. 1024.
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land company, and each deed contained provisions, in the form of
covenants, restricting the use of the land as mentioned. The deeds
gave to each owner a right to enforce the restrictions as against all
owners in the addition and stated that the covenants were made for the
benefit of the grantor "and its past or future grantees of other lands"
in the addition. Proceedings were instituted by the local school district
to take land in this addition for the purpose of erecting thereon a school
house. It was conceded that the construction of the building would be
a violation of the restriction, if done by a grantee under the land company. Plaintiffs were owners, under the land company, of a lot adjacent to the land which the school district was seeking to condemn,
and the land so to be taken was admitted by all concerned to be subject to the burdens in favor of plaintiffs.
The question in the condemnation proceedings was whether plaintiffs
were entitled to compensation for the destruction of the restriction. The
circuit court held that they were not because the restriction was not
property within the meaning of the constitution. The Supreme Court
granted the two writs and required the circuit court to allow damages to
plaintiffs. All of the judges who concurred in the decision of the court
considered plaintiff's right, as a covenantee, a property right,2 an easement. One judge, over the dissent of the others, suggested that in any
event plaintiffs should be compensated for the collateral damage that
would result to them from such a use of the land.3
In 1848 the decision of Lord Cottenham in Tulk v. Moxhay4 introduced a new kind of burden on the land of another. In that case plaintiff
sold certain lands to one Elms, requiring of him an agreement in the
deed that a certain part of the parcel conveyed should always be kept
as a garden. The purpose of the covenant was to benefit other lands of
plaintiff, and to enable plaintiff's tenants in the enjoyment of this other
land to have the use and the benefit of the garden on this adjacent land
granted to Elms. Elms conveyed the land to defendant, who had notice of the agreement. Defendant threatened to violate the restrictions
but a court of equity enjoined the contemplated breach. Had plaintiff
brought his action at law upon the covenant, judgment would have been
for defendant since law courts deny that burdens of this nature run
with the land. 5 English law, as distinguished from equity, has recognized for the most part two types of incorporeal rights which attach to
ownership of land and pass with it into the hands of whomsoever it may
2. (1921) 232 S. W. 1. c. 1027.
3. (1921) 232 S. W. pp. 1028, 1029.
4. (1848) 2 Philips 774.
5. Brewster v. Kidgill (1763) 12 Mod.
166; Austerberry v. Oldham (1885) 29

Ch. 750; West Virginia Trans. Co. v.
Pipe Line Co. (1883) 22 West Va. 600,
46 Am. Rep. 527; Brewer v. Newbold
(1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 344.
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come:6
(1) covenants running with the land, which operate within a
very narrow field,7 and (2) rights, which are easements-true property
rights in the land of another-, burdens imposed on. one estate for the
benefits of another.8 But again the creation of easements are restricted
to a very narrow field and only such easements can be created as have
been immemorially recognized and sanctioned by law.9
The general rule in equity where one agrees with another that his
property shall be subject to certain burdens for the benefit of property
belonging to his promisee, is that the agreement is specifically enforceable.' 0 It should be clear in such a case that damages for a breach of
the agreement will not afford an adequate remedy. This is so because
the acts which the covenantor agreed to are to be done on the covenantor's land which is beyond the control of the covenantee. The latter
cannot take money awarded as damages and purchase the burden. The
burden is unique because it is associated with the covenantor's land.
If it is once conceded that the covenantee is entitled to specific relief from his covenantor, it will follow that the covenantee will be entitled to the same relief against anyone claiming under the covenantor
with notice of the agreement. It is accordingly well established that the
covenantee can enforce the burden as against all claiming under the
covenantor, who are not bona fide purchasers for value."
But a bona
fide purchase will cut off the right of enforcement, which would seem to
indicate quite clearly that the covenantee's right is merely an equity, and
not a right legal in its nature.' 2 Because the subject matter of the agreement is land, it might be argued that these burdens should be kept within
definite and defined limits, and some courts have refused to enforce them
unless they "touch and concern the land," 13 thereby affording an apt
illustration of the application of the maxim that "equity follows the law."
But for the most part such has not been the rule and the covenant has
6. Holmes, The Common Law, chap.
XI.
7. Tiffany, Real Property, 2d ed., secs.
344-346.
8. On this distinction, see Holmes,
The Common Law, chap. XI.
9. Hill v. Tupper (1863) 7 H. & C.
121.
10. Tulk v. Moxhay, supra, note 4;
Franklyn v. Tuton (1821) 5 Maddock
469; Manners v. Johnson (1875) 1 Ch.
673; Hood v. Ry. Co. (
) 8 Eq. 666;
Prospect Park etc. R. R. v. Coney Is.
land etc. R. R. (1894) 144 N. Y. 152, 39
N. E. 17. See also Stevens v. Realty Co.

(1902) 173 Mo. 511, 73 S. W. 505;
Sharp v. Cheatham (1885) 88 Mo. 498;
Keating v. Korfhage (1885) 88 Mo. 524;
St. Louis etc. Co. v. Kennett Estate
(1903) 101 Mo. App. 370, 74 S. W. 474.
11. Coughlin v. Barker (1891) 46 Mo.
App. 54 (dictum); Rodgers v. Hosegood
(1900) L. R., 1900, 2 Ch. 388. See also
Sharp v. Cheatham, supra, note 10.
12. Carter v. Williams (1870) 9 Eq.
678; Wilson v. Hart (1866) 1 Ch. App.
463; London Co. v. Gomm (1881) 20
Ch. 562, p. 583.
13. Norcross v. James (1885)
140
Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946.
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been enforced against all grantees under the covenantor with notice, unless of course the court in a particular case has inclined to the opinion
that the particular burden imposed is contrary to some policy of one
kind or another. 1 4 These rights have usually been described as restrictions, because the covenants are usually of a negative character, but this
is accidental, it would seem, and a covenant imposing affirmative action
15
on the covenantor should be and has been recognized as enforceable.
Who may enforce these rights? It is certain that if the parties to
the original agreement intend that the burden shall be for the benefit
of the covenantee alone, he alone will have the right to enforce it.16 But
suppose that it is the intention of the parties that the benefit shall run
with the land of the covenantee. 'If this 'eally is the purpose of the
parties the benefit ought to run and the cases so hold. 17 Indeed, it has
been held that a subsequent grantee of the favored land may enforce
the covenant even though he did not know of the existence of the covenant at the time he acquired title.'8 The theory, apparently, is that the
equitable right is appurtenant to and a part of the legal title. This, of
course, is not: literally the case.
In cases where there is an express statement that the benefit of the
covenant is to pass with the land, there is no difficulty in determining the
rights of subsequent grantees of the covenantee. The only matter that
will usually prevent the running of the benefit is a bona fide purchase of
the servient estate, a release or a waiver by the covenantee or one of his

14. Robinson v. Webb (1880) 68 Ala.
393; Frye v. Partridge (1876) 82 Ill.
267; Stines v. Dorman (1874) 25 Ohio
St. 580; American Co. v. Paper Co.
(1897) 83 Fed. 619.
15. Merlin v. Cock (1868) 6 Eq. 252;
Sharp v. Cheatham (1885) 88 Mo. 498;
Carsen v. Percy (1879) 57 Miss. 97. If
performance of the contract involved
continuous activity by the covenantor or
his successors in title, a court could refuse specific performance on the ground
that equity will not supervise performance
of such an agreement. See Beck v. Allison (1874) 56 N. Y. 366. But apparently this difficulty has not as a rule deterred the courts from granting relief in
this class of cases. See Jones v. Parker
(1895) 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044;
Lane v. Newdigate (1804) 10 Vesey 192.
In the case last cited the decree of the
court was negative in form, i. e. the

court forbade the defendant to break his
agreement, but this in truth, it is submitted, is the same as enforcing specifically the covenant.
16. Keats v. Lyon (1869) 2 Ch. 218;
Clark v. McGhee (1896) 159 Ill. 518, 42
N. E. 965; Haines v. Einwachter (1903)
55 Atl. (N. J.) 38; Clapp v. Wilder
(1900) 176 Mass. 332, 57 N. E. 692.
17. Nottingham Brick etc. Co. v. But.
ler (1901) 16 Q. B. 261; Coughlin v.
Barker, supra, note 11; Coudert v. Sayre
(1890) 46 N. J. Eq. 386, 19 At. 190;
Bower v. Smith (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 456,
74 Atl. 675; Lattimore v. Livermore
(1878) 72 N. Y. 174. See also Baker v.
St. Louis (1879) 7 Mo. App. 429, aff'd.
75 Mo. 671.
18. Rodgers v. Hosegood, supra, note
11; but see contra DeGray v. Monmouth
Beach etc. Co. (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 329,
24 Atl. 388 (dictum).
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5
Often the intention is not expressed. The rule, however, is
grantees3
clear. It is a problem of ascertaining the intention and it will have to
20
It seems
be discovered in the circumstances accompanying the covenant.
safe to say, however, that the courts are prone to impute an intention to
benefit the land of the covenantee, if only the nature of the burden imposed is such as will be calculated to enhance the value of the land as
21
land.
Sometimes covenants are expressly or by implication exchanged between the parties with the end in view of imposing burdens on the land
of each of the covenantors in favor of the land of the other and it may
be the intent of the covenantors that the benefit of the covenant shall
run with the land. In this case there is no objection to the benefit running and, as in the case of a single covenant, if the intention is present,
22
Mutual covenants are usually found in cases similar to the
it will run.
one under review, where a large tract of land is divided for sale into
lots, all of which are subject to the same restrictions. Because the owner in such a case plans to sell the lots, it is usually held that the sole
purpose of the imposition of the burden is to benefit all the lots in any
It would seem under these facts that no other intent
buyer's hands23
with respect to the burden could be found. Therefore, all grantees ought

restriction was trivial and the damage
19. Where the covenants are mutual,
resulting negligible.
and burdens are imposed on both parties
20. Coughlin v. Barker, supra, note
a substantial breach by one will prevent
11; Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock etc.
his enforcing the restriction as against
the other. See Compton v. Strauch, inCo. (1913) 169 Mo. App. 715, 155 S. W.
861; Clapp v. Wilder (1900) 176 Mass.
fra, note 23. That a breach by one may
amount to a wavier, see Scharer v. Pant- 332, 57 N. E. 692; Hemsley v. Marlborough etc. Co. (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 596,
ler (1907) 127 Mo. App. 433, 105 S. W.
668. As a waiver, see Pete v. Poerstel, 61 Atl. 455; Clark v. Martin (1865) 49
Pa. 289; Ball v. Millikin (1910) 31 R. I.
infra, note 23. If the restriction has
36, 76 Atl. 789.
lapsed before the trial of the action,
21. Doerr v. Cobbs (1909) 146 Mo.
obviously no specific relief will be given.
App. 342, 123 S. W. 547; Clark v. MarSanders v; Dixon (1905) 114 Mo. App.
tin, Ball v. Millikin, supra, note 20;
229, 89 S. W. 577. It has been held that
Post v. Weil (1889) 115 N. Y. 361, 22
if the plaintiff's interest is too remote as
N. E. 145. See also Coughlin v. Barker,
to vesting in possession specific performsupra, note 11; Whitaker v. Lafayette etc.
ance will be denied. Johnston v. Hall
Co. (1917) 197 Mo. App. 377, 196 S. W.
(1865) 2 Kay & Johnson 414 (plaintiff a
109; Zinn v. Sidler (1916) 268 Mo. 680,
reversioner, following a long term.) As
187 S. W. 1172.
a general rule the courts are not de22. See Collins v. Castle (1886) 36
terred from giving relief merely because
no great damage is caused the plaintiff Ch. D. 243; Hutchinson v. Ulrich (1893)
145 I1. 336, 34 N. E. 556; Peabody v.
as a result of the restriction's violation.
Wilson (1895) 82 Md. 186, 32 Atl. 386.
See cases cited infra note 23. But see
See Sharp v. Ropes (1872) 110 Mass. 381.
Forsee v. Jackson (1915) 192 Mo. App.
23. King v. Union Trust Co. (1909)
408, 182 S. W. 783, where the court
226 Mo. 351, 126 S. W. 415; Hall v.
denied relief because the violation of the
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to be given a right to enforce the covenants, if such right can be given
consistently with principles. Suppose that A owns the original tract and
sells one lot to B, and there are mutual covenants exchanged that the
lot granted and those retained shall be subject to the same burdens. In
such a case it would be held, if A sold other lots, that the grantees of such
lots could hold B, and those claiming under him with notice, to the
burden originally imposed on B.24 But suppose that A sold a lot to C,
after he had sold B his lot, and that C broke his covenant. Could B
hold C, or those who claimed under C with notice of the covenant? It
is clear that there is no technical privity between B and C, because C
never made any agreement whatsoever with B nor could he have, foi
at the time that B acquired his land, C stood in no relation at all to any
of the lots. C, not being at that time an owner, could not have obligated himself with respect to the use that the lots were to be put to. But
it is not to be forgotten that A at the time that he granted to B, bound
all of the remaining lots for the benefit of B's lot, and it is proper to hold
that C took: his lot subject to the same burden.2 5 It could also be said
in B's behalf that the covenant, which A exacted from C, was for the
benefit of all prior grantees of other lots and that A ought to have a
right as a beneficiary to hold C to his obligation.a2
This theory of C's
liability seems unnecessary and strained, but it is understandable and
workable, if a court were disposed to allow a beneficiary to sue under a
contract made for his benefit. But some courts do not'favor this doctrine.
Occasionally there is a subdivision of real estate into lots for purposes of sale and it is announced that the lots sold are to be subject to
restrictions. After such an announcement lots may be sold but the
convenants contained in the deeds are not mutual but only binding upon
Wesster (1879) 7 Mo. App. 56; Hirsey v.
Church (1908) 130 Mo. App. 566, 109
S. W. 60; Compton Hill etc. Co. v.
Stranch (1911) 162 Mo. App. 76, 141 S.
W. 1159; See also Bub v. McFarland
(1917) 196 S. W. 373; Bolin v. Tyrel
etc. Co. (1913) 178 Mo. App. 1, 160 S.
W. 558; Thompson v. Lingan (1913) 172
Mo. App. 64, 154 S. W. 808; Noel v.
Hill (1911) 158 Mo. App. 426, 138 S. W.
364; Godfrey v. Hampton (1910) 148 Mo.
App. 157, 127 S. W. 626; Kitchen v.
Hawley (1910) 150 Mo. App. 497, 131
S. W. 142; ','ahr v. Cape (1909) 143
Mo. App. 114, 122 S. W. 379; Fete v.
Foerstel (1911) 159 Mo. App. 75, 139 S.
W. 820; Plank v. Eaton (1905) 115 Mo.

App. 171, 89 S. W. 586; Doerr v. Cobbs,
supra, note 21; Coughlin v. Barker, supra, note 11.
See also accord Hop.
kins v. Smith (1894) 162 Mass. 444, 38
N. E. 1122; Newberry v. Barkalow (1909)
75 N. J. Eq. 128, 71 Atl. 752.
24. Parker v. Nightingale (1863)
6
Allen (Mass.) 341.
See also cases cited
supra note 23.
25. Hopkins v. Smith
(1894)
162
Mass. 444, 38 N. E. 1122; Barrow v.
Richard (1840) 8 Paige (N. Y.) 351, 35
Am. Dec. 713; Brower v. Jones (1856)
23 Barb. (N. Y.) 153.
26. Brower v. Jones, supra, note 25,
and see H. F. Stone, Equitable Rights
19 Col. Law Rev. I. c. 185 et seq.
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the grantees. In such a case a question might arise whether a subsequent grantee would be bound in favor of a prior grantee who bought
his lot with the understanding that all lots were to be burdened. If no
convenant was exacted from the subsequent grantee, the only basis for
holding him would be that the original owner, when he made his grant
to the first taker, under an announcement that all lots were to be restricted, by implication agreed that the lots retained by him would be
subject to the same burden as was imposed on the lot granted to the prior
grantee. It would seem that such an implied covenant on the part of the
original owner would be entirely proper, and if it were implied, a subsequent grantee who took with notice of the burden would be bound
27
This obligawhether he expressly covenanted to be so bound or not.
tion would be on the basis heretofore stated, namely, that as the original
owner held the land subject to the burden, all holding under him other
than bona fide purchasers should be equally bound. 28 If the last suggestion is sound, and a subsequent grantee who takes without a covenant imposing the burden is bound to a prior grantee, it would follow all
the more easily that a subsequent grantee, who did covenant that his
lot should be burdened would be bound in favor of a prior grantee. In
such a case not only would we have the same basis for holding that the
original owner by implication bound the lots retained in favor of his
first grantee that we had in the first assumed case, but also we would
be able to hold that the covenant exacted from the subsequent grantee
29
was taken for the first grantee's benefit.
It has been held that a covenantee may enforce the equitable burden
27. Maxwell v. East River Bank
(1858) 3 Bos. (N. Y.) 124, 16 N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 124; Spicer v. Martin (1888) L. R.
14 App. Cas. 12; McDougal v. Schneider
(1909) 118 N. Y. Sup. 861. See also Semple v. Scwarz (1908) 130 Mo. App. 65,
109 S. W. 633, where the suggested result
was reached but the court did not discuss
the problem. See further Coughlin v.
Barker, supra, note 11; Hirsey v. Church
and King v. Union Trust Co., supra,
note 23. In Doerr v. Cobbs, supra, note
21, it was held that if there had been a
building scheme, a prior grantee could
have held a subsequent grantee to his
covenant.
28. See supra note 25.
29. See supra note 26 and accord
Merriwether v. Joy (1900) 85 Mo. App.
634. Cf. Reed v. Hazard (1915) 178
Mo. App. 547, 174 S. W. 111; Miller v.

Klein (1913) 177 Mo. App. 557, 160 S.
W. 562.
Suppose that one of the lots sold under a building scheme is subdivided and
built upon by both owners, both of whom
have taken with knowledge of the restriction. It has been held that if one
of the owners violates the restriction the
other has no remedy. It is said that the
restrictions are imposed not to benefit
portions of any one lot but merely to
benefit other lots. King v. Dickerson
(1889) 49 Ch. 596. See also Stone, Equitable Rights. 19 Col. Law Rev. 1. c.
188. Might not this decision have been
the other way? It is suggested that it
could have been assumed that the parties intended (as each subdivision was
bound for the benefit of other lots)
that each subdivision should be bound
for the benefit of the other subdivision.
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where the servient estate is in the hands of a disseisor.30 This case with
other reasons has led certain scholars to suggest that the nature of the
covenantee's right is in rem.8' The underlying reason for such a contention is that the disseisor can in no way be connected with the covenant and that, therefore, the right of the covenantee must be assimilated
to legal ownership. It is said that the position of the covenantee is so
similar to that of the owner of an easement that the rights of the two
parties are practically identical and that both must be classified as rights
in rem. On the other hand serious exception has been taken to such a
contention and it has been denied that the covenantee has anything but
32
a right in personam.
In all cases where a person has a specifically enforceable equity there
is a right "in personam ad rem," which right will be enforced as against
the res, through the holder of the same for the time being, whenever
it is just that such a duty should be imposed. So, where land is held
subject to such an equity, the equity is enforceable not only against the
original obligor but against all who claim under him with notice and
all who claim under him without notice, not purchasers for value. Suppose that jV has a right to a conveyance of land from B and that the
land comes into the possession of C, who is either a mala fide purchaser
or an heir of B, or a donee of the latter. In each case A' could compel
a conveyance from C. This would not be because A had title to the land
but because of A's original equity it would be unjust to permit C to
keep the same. So, too, if C had the land by adverse possession a conveyance could be compelled at the instance of A. This being the case
it would be correct to say, not that A owned the property but that by
reason of his equity he had a right as against an "indeterminate number"
of people to prevent interference with his specifically enforceable equity
and that if anyone in that class did interfere, to compel a performance
of the equitable duty by such an intermeddler.33 It is submitted that the
situation of the covenantee is the same as that of A in the above supposed case. The covenantee has no legal ownership of the burden imposed. He has not an easement but he has a right "in personam ad rem",
a right to compel any person, who holds the property burdened or owns
the same, to perform the burden, unless there is an overpowering equity
Such an assumption would seem to ac-

cord with an ordinary man's expectations. The buyer knows that each subdivision is restricted. So does the seller. Does not the buyer reasonably assume that the restriction is for the benefit of his subdivision as well as for the
benefit of outside lots?

30.

Re

Nisbett and

Potts Contract

(1906) 1906 1 Ch. 383.
31. A. W Scott, Nature of the Rights
of the Cestui, 17 Col. Law Rev. 1. c. 285.
32. H. F. Stone, Nature of the Rights
of the Cestui, 17 Col. Law Rev. I. c. 482.
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NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
in favor of the latter. Normally the only equity of such a nature is
that which is possessed by a bona fide purchaser for value. In all other
cases the holder or owner of the burdened property is either aiding the
original covenantor in a breach of his obligation or else is unconscionably
but consciously himself interfering with and preventing the convenantee
from getting the fruits of his bargain.
It is now proper to determine whether the right of plaintiffs in the
case under review was of such a nature as to justify its being classified
as property and for the taking of which there should be compensation.
34
we
Naturally, if we adopt the suggestion that the right is one in rem,
should hold that the school district should pay for the value of the restrictions. The principal case is in accord with this proposition, and
there are three other decisions known to the writer which take the same
position.3 5 But even if one were not inclined to go so far as to say that
plaintiffs' right is a strict property right, it is not believed that such disinclination ought to lead to a different result. The word "property" in
the constitution ought not to be given a narrow and technical meaning
but ought to be held to mean every valuable proprietary interest which
is susceptible of enjoyment. Surely the right of plaintiffs is of such a nature and it seems that courts should protect the same even though it is not
a true easement. Some courts, however, have held that the right of a
covenantee is not a true property right and that therefore if it is taken
36
by the government no compensation is due. In U. S. v. Certain Lands
the federal government sought to condemn land for coast defense purposes. The land to be taken was subject to restrictions against carrying
on any trade thereon and the owners of these restrictive rights claimed
compensation. The court held that the erection of the coast defense
would not be a violation of the restrictions, as it would not constitute
carrying on a trade; but also held that even if the erection would be
a violation of the restriction the owners would not be entitled to compensation, because the covenant was against public policy. It was stated
that the claimants did not have any property right by virtue of these restrictions as they were given "no right to go on the lands taken or use
them";37 that all the claimants had was an agreement that the lands
should not be used in a certain way, which in this particular case amounted to an agreement that the federal government should not have the
power to take and use the land for proper governmental purposes. Such
a contract was said to be against public policy. The decision of the Cir34. Supra, note 31, and see 17 Col.
Law Rev. 1. c. 281.
35. Flynn v. R. R. Co. (1916) 218
N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913; Hays v. Wav.
erly (1893) 51 N. J. Eq. 345, 27 Atl.
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cuit Court was followed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the same
case 3s and has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in two similar cases.
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It hardly seems possible that the line of reasoning put forward by the
learned courts in the above cited cases can be sound and the result
seems unjust. In every case where the government exercises a right of
eminent domain it is permitting the owner of the property to say: "I
have purchased a right to prevent you from exercising your governmental
capacities. I cannot prevent this altogether, but I can, because of the
constitution, make you purchase this right". In other words, the constitution contemplates that the government shall pay for privileges of this
kind which it takes, and the government has no grounds for complaint
just because to this extent its activities are hampered and fettered.
Suppose that a man has an easement of light and air; suppose that
the government destroys the same by taking the servient estate; it has
been held that the government must pay the owner of the dominant estate the value of his easement. 40 Now if the owner of such a dominant
estate is allowed compensation, the court awarding the same will be doing just what the court in U. S. v. Certain Lands says ought not to be
done. After all, what is an easement of light and air, aside from techni.
cal rules of conveyancing? It is nothing but an agreement that the
owner of the servient estate will not build in such a way as to keep out
sunlight and air. Is it not an agreement to the effect that the government, if it needs the land, will not take or destroy the right without paying for it? Does not a court which allows damages for such an easement validate the agreement? Of course, it can be said that the owner
of the easement has a right in rem, although in this case he cannot go
on the land of the servient tenement. But even so, this right in rem in
the way that it operates does not differ materially from the right in
personam, which the owner of the restrictive covenant has. Each is a
valuable right susceptible of proprietory enjoyment and should be paid
for, if taken, unless the law of eminent domain is to be based on technicalities and distinctions where there are in truth no substantial differences.
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